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Wasantha Perera (Sri Lanka), Nada Kulendran (Australia) 
New evidence of short-run underpricing in Australian IPOs 
Abstract 
The short-run market performance of initial public offerings (IPOs) indicates that the prices are often underpriced. This 
is widely accepted as a universal phenomenon. To find out whether Australian IPOs are underpriced, this paper 
analyzes the short-run market performance of 254 IPOs by industry, listing year and issue year. To measure the 
performance, the first-day returns are divided into the opening price primary market and the closing price secondary 
market, and the post-listing returns are also examined.  
The study found that, overall, Australian IPOs were underpriced by 25.47% based on abnormal returns and 26.43% on 
raw returns on the first-day primary market, which was statistically significant at the 1% level. However, analysis of 
the secondary market indicates that the Australian IPOs were overpriced by 1.55% and 1.54% on abnormal and raw 
returns, respectively, which was statistically significant at the 5% level. The examination of post-listing returns shows 
that Australian IPOs were underpriced based on cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) on the 3rd, 6th, and 10thdays by 
24.63%, 24.06%, and 23.34%, respectively. The primary and post-listing analysis shows that IPOs in the industrial 
sector are more attractive to investors, whereas those in the chemical and materials sector are less attractive compared 
to other sectors. As far as the investors’ wealth is concerned, the study concludes that the short-run market performance 
analysis should consider both the first-day and post-listing returns.  
Keywords: Australian IPOs, short-run market performance, underpricing, primary & secondary market. 
JEL Classification: G12, G14, G32. 
Introduction
Prior studies have paid much attention to the 
evaluation of the market performance of initial 
public offerings (IPOs) owing to the wealth of 
investors in different countries. They have examined 
IPO market performance in two different periods – 
short-run and long-run – in terms of three 
phenomena: the underpricing or short-run market 
phenomenon, the underperformance or long-run 
market phenomenon, and the “hot issue” market 
phenomenon. 
Underpricing is a short-run market phenomenon 
first documented by Stoll and Curley (1970), Logue 
(1973), and Ibbotson (1975) who used the first-day 
return to explain the level of underpricing. Ritter 
(1991) initially examined the long-run 
underperformance phenomenon by using post-
listing returns and calculating the following 
measures: cumulative abnormal return (CAR), 
cumulative raw return (CRR), wealth relative (WR), 
and buy-and-hold return (BHR). These measures 
were also used by other researchers (Moshirian et al., 
2010; Ajlouni and Abu-Ein, 2009; Ahmad-Zaluki et 
al., 2007; Omran, 2005; Kooli and Suret, 2004). The 
“hot issue” market phenomenon was introduced to 
the finance literature by Ibbotson and Jaffe (1975). 
It examined the short-run cyclical behavior of 
underpricing using the average initial return (AIR). 
Subsequently, this hypothesis was tested by many 
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researchers (Ritter, 1984; Ibbotson et al., 1988) in 
different countries. 
However, a review of past Australian IPO studies 
indicates that short-run market performance has not 
been evaluated by combining the first-day opening 
price primary market return, the first-day closing 
price secondary market return, and the post-listing 
returns. This type of IPO market performance 
analysis could provide more valuable information to 
investors. An analysis of short-run performance 
based on the first-day return itself may not provide 
sufficient information to investors, as price levels 
vary between the first and post-listing days. Further, 
variations in the opening and closing price levels 
of the first day of listing indicate more uncertainty 
about the future performance of IPOs due to 
factors such as lack of information and demand 
condition. The post-listing prices are also needed 
to measure short-run market performance, 
because the market needs more time to settle. 
Therefore, this paper seeks to evaluate the short-
run market performance of Australian IPOs using 
the first-day primary and secondary market 
returns, and the post-listing returns by industry and 
different sample periods. 
The remainder of this article is organized as follows. 
Section 1 reviews the international evidence on 
underpricing. Section 2 covers the data and 
methodology. Section 3 discusses the results and 
analyses and Final Section concludes the major 
findings. 
1. The international evidence on underpricing 
Table 1 shows the first-day average return of IPOs 
in selected developed and emerging markets.
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Table 1. Average first-day returns of IPOs in selected developed and emerging markets 
Country Average initial return Sample size Sample period Author(s) 
Panel A: developed markets
Australia 19.8% 1103 1976-06 Lee et al.; Woo; Pham; Ritter 
Canada 7.1% 635 1971-06 
Jog & Riding; Jog &Srivastava; Kryzanowski, Lazrak &
Rakita; Ritter 
France 10.7% 686 1983-06 
Husson & Jacquillat; Leleux & Muzyka; Paliard &
Belletante; Derrien & Womack;Chahine; Ritter 
Germany 25.3% 700 1978-08 Ljungqvist; Rocholl: Ritter; Vismara 
Japan 40.1% 2628 1970-08 
Fukuda; Dawson & Hiraki; Hebner &Hiraki; Pettway &
Kaneko; Hamao, Packer & Ritter; Kaneko & Pettway; 
Ritter; Tokyo IPO.com 
New Zealand 20.3% 214 1979-06 Vos & Cheung; Camp & Munro; Ritter 
Portugal 11.6% 28 1992-06 Almeida & Duque; Ritter 
South Africa 18% 285 1928-07 Page & Reyneke; Ali, Subrahmanyam & Gleason; Ritter
Spain 10.9% 128 1986-06 Ansotegui & Fabregat; Alvarez Otera 
Sweden 27.3% 406 1980-06 Rydqvist; Schuster; Simonov; Ritter 
U.K. 16.3% 4198 1959-08 Dimson; Levis
U.S. 16.9% 12028 1960-08 Ibbotson et al.; Ritter 
Panel B: emerging markets
Brazil 48.7% 180 1979-06 Aggarwal, Leal & Hernandez; Saito 
China 164.5% 1394 1990-05 Chen, Choi & Jiang
Egypt 8.4% 53 1990-00 Omran
India 92.7% 2811 1990-07 Marisetty & Subrahmanyam 
Jordan 149% 53 1999-08 Marmar
Korea 55.2% 1490 1980-06 
Dhatt, Kim & Lim; Ihm; Choi & Heo; Moshirian, Ng & Wu; 
Cho; Ritter 
Malaysia 69.6% 350 1980-06 Isa; Isa & Yong; Yong 
Mexico 15.9% 88 1987-94 
Aggarwal, Leal & Hernandez; Eijgenhuijsen & van der 
Valk
Sri Lanka 34% 105 1987-08 Samarakoon
Turkey 10.6% 315 1990-08 Kiymaz; Durukan; Ince; Kucukkocaoglu 
Source: These figures were taken from Loughran et al. (2010) and the papers published by the authors.
The AIR range of developed markets varies from 7.1% 
to 40.1%, whereas that of emerging markets varies 
from 8.4% to 164.5%. The average sample sizes of the 
developed and emerging markets are 1919 and 684, 
respectively. The developed market results are more 
consistent than those of the emerging markets because 
of the lesser variation in the first-day average returns 
and the large sample size. Both markets show that 
investors achieve high returns on the very first day that 
a company’s shares are listed on a stock exchange, 
which emphasizes that underpricing has been a 
persistent empirical phenomenon for many decades.  
Moshirian et al. (2010) examined the price 
performance of emerging and developed Asian 
markets and found that China, Korea, Malaysia, Hong 
Kong, Japan, and Singapore were underpriced on the 
first-day returns by 202.93%, 70.3%, 61.81%, 21.43%, 
34.04%, and 33.10%, respectively. Sohail et al. (2010) 
indicated that Pakistan IPOs were underpriced under 
the general state of economy by 42.17%, 40.99%, 
37.35%, 38.17%, and 39.38% at the close of the 1st, 
5th, 10th, 15th,and 20th days, respectively. Chan et al. 
(2004) also analyzed the Chinese IPO market and 
found that the average level of underpricing in A-
shares and B-shares was 178% and 11.6%, 
respectively. Further, Banerjee et al. (2009) found that 
on average investors of Singaporean IPOs out-
performed in the short-run market. 
The US IPO market has been researched extensively 
by many researchers over the last two decades. 
Johnston and Madura (2002) studied internet and non-
internet IPOs during the period from 1996 to 2000 and 
showed that the initial returns were more favorable for 
the former than the latter. Further, they showed that the 
level of underpricing of internet firms did not become 
statistically significant due to the demise of the 
internet sector – of a sample of 366 IPOs, the AIR 
was 78.5 per cent. The US IPO market was also 
analyzed by Loughran and Schultz (2006) and 
Ritter and Welch (2002), who reported that the 
AIRs were 18.1% and 18.8%, respectively. 
Further, Ibbotson (1975), Ritter (1987), and 
Ibbotson et al. (1994) reported that first-day returns 
were between 11.4% and 47.8%. 
The Australian IPO market has also been widely 
examined over the past years. Finn and Higham (1988) 
reported that Australian industrial and commercial 
IPOs were underpriced by 29.2%. Lee et al. (1996), 
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How et al. (1995), and Dimovski et al. (2011) also 
reported that industrial IPOs were underpriced in the 
short-run market by 11.86%, 19.74%, and 29.6%, 
respectively. However, Dimovski and Brooks (2008) 
and How (2000) documented that mining IPOs were 
underpriced by 13.3% and 107.18%, respectively. 
Nguyen et al. (2010) found that resource IPOs were 
underpriced by 16.13%. Dimovski and Brooks (2005; 
2004) also found that Australian mining and energy 
IPOs and industrial and resource IPOs were 
underpriced by 17.93% and 25.6%, respectively, on 
the first-day return. Da Silva Rosa et al. (2003) 
reported that venture capital-backed and non-venture 
capital-backed IPOs were underpriced by 25.47%, 
whereas Gong and Shekhar (2001) found privatized 
IPOs were underpriced by 11.96%. Bird and Yeung 
(2010) and Bayley et al. (2006) also found that 
Australian IPOs were underpriced by 37.35% and 
26.72%, respectively. 
The evidence from the international literature on 
underpricing shows that the level of underpricing 
could vary according to factors such as the sample 
period, state of the economy, and nature of the market 
or industry. Therefore, there is a need to measure the 
level of underpricing by industry in the current time 
period due to the different state of economic period. 
2. Data and methodology 
2.1. Data and sample selection. In order to analyze 
the short-run market performance of Australian IPOs, 
all IPO data were collected from the Connect 4 
database (www.connect4.com.au), which is more 
specialized for IPOs. The study examines fixed-price 
equity IPOs listed in the Australian Securities 
Exchange (ASX) from January 2006 to January 2011. 
A sample was selected based on the stratified random 
sampling method by industry or sector as a main 
criterion. To analyze IPOs by industry, all the listed 
IPOs during this period were sub-divided into seven 
sectors using the industry criterion. IPOs of the finance, 
property, equity trust, and closed-end funds sector 
were excluded from the sample following other 
researchers (Dimovski and Brooks, 2004; Ahmad-
Zaluki et al., 2007). These researchers mentioned that 
IPOs in the finance, trust, and closed-end funds sector 
are not comparable with non-financial companies. 
These companies’ annual reports are normally 
prepared according to different statutory requirements. 
Mergers, takeovers, and restructuring schemes were 
also eliminated from the sample, because they 
undeservedly impact the IPO companies’ performance. 
Due to the large number of listed IPOs in the resource 
sector, the selected sample from this industry 
represents only 33% of the total listed IPOs, while 
other sectors represent 100%. Based on the availability 
of data, 254 IPOs were finally selected as a samplefor 
this study. 
Table 2 shows the number of sample companies, 
offer proceeds (market price per share * number of 
issued shares) and money left on the table (first-day 
returns in terms of AU$), which are classified by 
industry, listed year and issued year. 
Table 2. Number of sample companies, offer proceeds and money left on the table by industry, listing year, 
and issue year 
Sample classification No.of IPOs % 
Offer proceeds1
(AU$ 000’) 
%
Money left on the table2
(AU$ 000’) 
By industry 
Resources (energy, metals & mining) 143 56% 1279743 12% 1137267
Chemicals/materials 4 2% 953400 9% 113042
Industrials 46 18% 6717995 65% 190481
Consumer discretionary/staples 31 12% 588975 6% 72296
Information technology 20 8% 645582 6% 96831
Telecommunications 4 2% 22573 0% 2749
Utilities 6 2% 79750 1% -7020
Total 254 10288018  582106
By listing year 
2006 68 27% 2856066 28% 216233
2007 91 36% 1607983 16% 244248
2008 29 11% 361219 4% 166584
2009 17 7% 368500 4% 45445
2010 41 16% 5045650 49% -85511
2011 8 3% 48600 0% -4893
Total 254 10288018  582106
By issue year 
2005 9 4% 53296 1% 19299
2006 69 27% 2887770 28% 191578
2007 96 38% 1666183 16% 421421
2008 19 7% 272019 3% -10911
Investment Management and Financial Innovations, Volume 13, Issue 2, 2016
102
Table 2 (cont.). Number of sample companies, offer proceeds and money left on the table by industry, 
listing year, and issue year 
Sample classification No.of IPOs % 
Offer proceeds1
(AU$ 000’) 
%
Money left on the table2
(AU$ 000’) 
By issue year 
2009 16 6% 332000 3% 52203
2010 45 18% 5076750 49% -91484
Total 254 10288018  582106
Notes: 1.Market price per share X Number of issued shares. 2 Money left on the table indicates the first-day returns in AU$ earned by initial 
investors and also acts as transfer from the issuing IPO firm to initial investor. Itis calculated by: (Market price per share- Issued price 
per share) X Number of issued shares. 
In comparing the number of IPOs with offer 
proceeds by industry, the resource sector has 56% of 
the sample IPO companies, but gives only 12% of 
the total sample offer proceeds. The industrial sector 
represents 18% of the sample IPO companies and 
contributes 65% of the total sample proceeds, which 
is the highest offer proceeds among the industries. 
The industrial sector has the highest value for 
money left on the table, which shows that its 
average market price is higher than that of the 
other sectors. The utility sector indicates a 
negative value for the money left on the table, 
which shows that the wealth of investors in this 
sector is diluted compared to the other sectors. 
Money left on the table had negative values in the 
listing years 2010 and 2011 and in the issue years 
2008 and 2010 due to the higher issue prices 
compared to the first-day market prices.  
2.2. Methodology. After selecting the sample of 
IPO companies by industry, listing year and issue year, 
the market prices of these companies were selected 
from the Morningstar database (www.morningstar. 
com.au). To measure the market performance of 
IPOs, this study selected the first-day adjusted 
opening and closing market prices, and the post-
listing adjusted prices. 
The first-day primary and secondary market raw 
returns were calculated using the following 
equations:
oi
oibi
i
P
PP
PR
,
,,  ,                                                (1) 
where PRi is the first-day primary market raw return 
for security݅measures between the issue price and 
the beginning price of the first day of trading, PRi,b
is the beginning price of security ݅ at the first trading 
day, and PRi,o is the issue (offer) price of security ݅
at the day of issue. 
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bici
i
P
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,
,,  ,                                                  (2) 
where SRi is the first-day secondary market raw 
return for security i measures between the beginning 
price and the closing of the first day of trading, PRi,c
is the closing price of security ݅ at the first day of 
trading, PRi,b is the beginning price of security i at 
the first trading day. 
From the above raw returns (PRi and SRi), the 
market-adjusted abnormal/excess returns were also 
calculated to measure the short-run market 
performance of an IPO. The abnormal/excess return 
is considered a superior performance measure 
relative to the raw return, because it adjusts the 
market return of each IPO. The market return can be 
calculated by using ASX indices such as ASX 200, 
ASX 300, or ASX 500. However, this study used 
the All Ordinaries Index (ASX 500) as a market 
benchmark to measure the abnormal/excess market 
returns, as it covers 95% of the listed company 
prices in the ASX. The All Ordinaries Index was 
obtained from the Data Stream database. The 
following equations were used to calculate the 
market-adjusted abnormal return (AR) and the 
market-adjusted average abnormal return (AAR): 
mtitit RRAR  ,                                                  (3) 
where ARit is the market-adjusted abnormal rate of 
return for company in period (t), Rit is the rate of 
return for company (i) in period (t) from PRi and 
SRi, Rmt is the rate of return on the benchmark 
(market) during the corresponding time period (t). 
¦   ni tit ARnAAR 1 .1 ,                                         (4) 
where AARt is the market-adjusted average 
abnormal return, n is the number of IPO companies 
in period (t). 
To determine whether the average market-adjusted 
abnormal returns are statistically significant, this 
study used the following t-statistics (Ritter, 1991; 
Brown and Warner, 1985; Omran, 2005): 
t
t
t
n
AARAARt V*)(  ,                                       (5)
where AARt is the average market-adjusted abnormal 
return for day t, and ɐt is the cross-sectional standard 
deviation of the abnormal return for day t.
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From the above market-adjusted average abnormal 
return, the market-adjusted average CAR was 
calculated following past studies (Ritter, 1991; 
Aktas et al., 2003). This measure is useful for 
analyzing the short-run performance of IPOs after 
listing. Therefore, the CAR was calculated for nine 
post-listing days by using the following equation: 
t
s
qtsq
AARCAR ¦   , ,                                          (6) 
where CARq,s is the market-adjusted post-listing 
return (performance) from event day q to event 
days. 
The t-statistic for the market-adjusted average CAR 
was computed as follows (Aktas et al., 2003): 
t
t
CAR
CAR
CARt
)(
)( V                                              (7) 
abnormal return over t days. 
3. Results and discussion 
This Section provides the statistical analysis and the 
resultsderived from the methodology discussed in 
section 3.2. The empirical findings of the short-run 
market performance on the first-day returns and the 
post- listing returns are discussed in sections 4.1 and 
4.2, respectively. 
3.1. The first-day returns of IPOs. The findings of 
the first-day raw and market-adjusted abnormal 
returns are discussed in terms of the first-day 
opening price primary market and the closing 
price secondary market. The results of both the 
primary and secondary market returns are given in 
Table 3. 
All sample companies were underpriced in the first-
day primary market by 26.43% based on the raw 
return and 25.47% based on the market-adjusted 
abnormal return. These returns were statistically 
significant at the 1% level. In comparison to the 
first-day primary market returns, the Australian 
IPOs were overpriced in the closing price secondary 
market by 1.54% and 1.55% based on raw returns 
and abnormal returns, respectively. These levels of 
overpricing in the closing price secondary market 
were statistically significant at the 5% level. 
If we examine IPOs by industry, in the primary 
market, the highest level of underpricing was seen 
in the industrial-sector IPOs, of which 67.01% was 
based on raw returns and 68.03% on abnormal 
returns. However, these underpricing levels were 
not statistically significant. The resources-sector 
IPOs were generally underpriced by 17.51% on raw 
returns and 16.64% on abnormal returns. These 
underpricing levels were statistically significant at 
the 1% level. The levels of underpricing (23.45% on 
raw returns and 23.88% on abnormal returns), in the 
telecommunication sector, were also statistically 
significant at the 1% and 5% levels. IPOs in the 
information technology sector were also 
underpriced on raw returns by 20.14%, which was 
statistically significant at the 10% level. In contrast 
with IPOs in other sectors, IPOs in the chemical and 
materials sector were overpriced by 5.68% based on 
raw returns and 10.91% based on abnormal returns. 
It is interesting to see that these IPOs earned 
negative returns in the primary market on the very 
first day in relation to both measures. However, 
these negative returns were not statistically 
significant. According to the closing price 
secondary market, the highest average overpricing 
level on raw returns was seen in the utility-industry 
IPOs (7.36%), which was statistically significant at 
10%, while the lowest was in the resources-sector 
IPOs (0.62%). According to the abnormal return, the 
highest overpricing level was seen in the utility 
sector (7.54%), which was statistically significant at 
the 5% level. and the lowest was in the resources 
sector (0.70%). The average overpricing levels in 
the chemical and materials sector on the raw and 
abnormal returns were 9.49% and 6.35%, 
respectively. These overpricing levels were 
statistically significant at the 5% level. The 
overpricing levels (4.52% on raw returns and 4.66% 
on abnormal returns), in the information technology 
sector, were also statistically significant at the 10% 
level. In the secondary market, underpricing was not 
found in any sector. 
The listing-year analysis shows that the highest 
level of underpricing took place in the primary 
market in year 2008 based on raw and abnormal 
returns by 98.09% and 106.37%, respectively. These 
levels of return were not statistically significant. In 
listing years 2006, 2007, and 2010, IPOs were 
underpriced on raw returns by 20.97%, 18.41%, and 
13.52%, respectively. These underpricing levels 
were statistically significant at the 1% level. 
According to the abnormal return, IPOs listed in 
2006, 2007, and 2010 were underpriced by 17.62%, 
16.38%, and 14.02%, respectively, which were also 
statistically significant at the 1% level. The IPOs in 
listing year 2009 were underpriced by 12.94% on 
raw returns, which was statistically significant at the 
5% level. Australian IPOs were overpriced in 2011 
by 0.1% based on raw returns and 4.12% on 
abnormal returns. Statistical significance cannot be 
seen in these overpricing levels. The listing-year 
classification of the secondary market shows that IPOs 
were not underpriced based on raw returns even 
though underpricing could be seen on abnormal 
returns in listing year 2008, which was not statistically 
significant. Statistically significant overpricing levels 
was found on both return measures in 2007 and 2010 
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only. Listed IPOs in 2007 and 2010 were overpriced 
on raw returns by 2.01% and 2.86%, respectively. 
These rates of overpricing were statistically significant 
at the 5% level. The overpricing levels of listed IPOs 
on abnormal returns (1.89% and 2.99%) in 2007 were 
statistically significant at the 10% and 5% levels, 
respectively. 
When we examine IPOs in the primary market by 
the issue year, issued IPOs in 2006, 2009, and 2010 
were underpriced by 10.66%, 15.72%, and 11.48%, 
respectively, based on raw returns. These levels of 
underpricing were statistically significant at the 1% 
level. The highest underpricing level was seen in 
2005 based on both returns, which was statistically 
significant at the 10% level, while the lowest wasin 
2006. Based on abnormal returns, the issued IPOs in 
2010 were underpriced by 11.15%, which was 
statistically significant at the 1% level. In issue 
years 2006 and 2009, the IPOs were underpriced by 
7.82% and 12.57% respectively, which were 
significant at the 5% level. In the Australian IPO 
market, overpricing was not found in any issue year, 
because the negative returns were not reported in 
these periods. Statistically significant overpricing 
can be found in the secondary market on both return 
measures in issue years 2007 and 2010. In 2007, 
issued IPOs were overpriced on raw and abnormal 
returns by 2.21% and 2.01%, respectively, and these 
were significant at the 5% level. The issued IPOs 
were overpriced on raw and abnormal returns in 
issue year 2010 by 2.45% and 2.58%, respectively. 
These overpricing levels were statistically 
significant at the 10% and 5% levels. The IPOs 
issued in all years were overpriced, except in 2008. 
Table 3. First-day returns: primary and secondary market 
Sample classification N
Primary market Secondary market 
ARR t-stat AAR t-stat ARR t-stat AAR t-stat
All sample companies 254 0.2643 2.68323*** 0.2547 2.58008*** -0.01542 -2.32125** -0.01552 -2.28958**
By industries 
Resources 143 0.1751 4.33212*** 0.1664 4.25926*** -0.00624 -0.68684 -0.00705 -0.75994
Chemical/materials 4 -0.0568 -0.30442 -0.1091 -0.64118 -0.06493 -2.23596** -0.06353 -2.08122**
Industrial 46 0.6701 1.28910 0.6803 1.30565 -0.01367 -1.02093 -0.01146 -0.84017
Consumer discretionary/staples 31 0.1874 1.49078 0.1829 1.40330 -0.01918 -0.98185 -0.01894 -0.97142
Information technology 20 0.2014 1.66072* 0.1414 1.11830 -0.04518 -1.71621* -0.04657 -1.69014*
Telecommunications 4 0.2345 2.70353*** 0.2388 2.37988** -0.04934 -0.74846 -0.04563 -0.64157
Utilities 6 0.119 0.82420 0.1009 0.70822 -0.07361 -1.89193* -0.07538 -2.00326**
By listingyear 
2006 68 0.2097 2.99575*** 0.1762 2.57990*** -0.00501 -0.38026 -0.00596 -0.44948
2007 91 0.1841 4.28153*** 0.1638 3.79262*** -0.02008 -1.98253** -0.01899 -1.83264*
2008 29 0.9809 1.17469 1.0637 1.27483 -0.00086 -0.03953 0.00093 0.04073
2009 17 0.1294 2.48327** 0.0910 1.35423 -0.01770 -0.45353 -0.02046 -0.50255
2010 41 0.1352 4.85376*** 0.1402 5.25645*** -0.02860 -1.96063** -0.02990 -2.06199**
2011 8 -0.0094 -0.10762 -0.0412 -0.48275 -0.03145 -1.29574 -0.03278 -1.40411
By issue year 
2005 9 0.7254 1.63799* 0.6245 1.43259 -0.03660 -0.58809 -0.03654 -0.58596
2006 69 0.1066 2.95490*** 0.0782 2.13436** -0.00478 -0.41303 -0.00577 -0.49171
2007 96 0.4609 1.81547* 0.4673 1.83624* -0.02212 -2.23252** -0.02086 -2.04693**
2008 19 0.0692 0.65319 0.0942 0.89698 0.00697 0.19132 0.00878 0.22897
2009 16 0.1572 3.50894*** 0.1257 2.22699** -0.01030 -0.34467 -0.01361 -0.45343
2010 45 0.1148 3.81010*** 0.1115 3.74274*** -0.02450 -1.88084* -0.02583 -1.99162**
Notes: N = sample size, ARR = average raw return, AAR = average abnormal return * statistically significant at 10% level,  
** statistically significant at 5% level, *** statistically significant at 1% level. 
3.2. The post-listing returns of IPOs. This section 
analyzes the post-listing returns by calculating the 
CAR for nine post-listing days. The calculated 
average CARs of all sample IPOs for the nine post-
listing days are shown in Figure 1.  
Table 4 provides only the post-listing returns for the 
3rd, 6th, and 10th days by all sample companies, 
industries, listing years and issue years. All sample 
IPO companies were underpriced based on CARs by 
24.63%, 24.06%, and 23.34% on the 3rd, 6th, and 
10th days, respectively. However, only day 6 was 
statistically significant at 10% level. The post-listing 
returns of all IPOs were decreasing from the 3rd day 
to the 10th day. 
All IPOs in the industrial sector were underpriced 
except in the chemicals and material sector. Only 
IPOs in the industrial sector were statistically 
significant in all three post-listing days and 
underpriced by 68.3%, 67.84%, and 66.29% in the 
3rd, 6th, and 10th days, respectively. The tele-
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communications sector was significant only in the 
6th day. The chemical and material industry is 
overpriced in the 3rd, 6th, and 10th days by 16.02%, 
18.41% and 23.33%, respectively. Only the return in 
day 6 was statistically significant at the 1% level. 
The highest level of underpricing was in the listing 
year 2008, which was statistically significant at 1% 
level. In 2008, the average levels of underpricing on 
the 3rd, 6th and 10th days were 98.72%, 98.20%, 
and 95.90%, respectively. The listed IPOs in 2011 
were overpriced only on the 3rd day and 6th day and 
underpriced on the 10th day. However, these 
overpricing levels were not statistically significant. 
The IPOs issued from 2005 to 2010 were 
underpriced on the 3rd, 6th, and 10th days, but 
only IPOs issued in 2005 were statistically 
significant in all three days. In 2007, the 
underpricing levels were statistically significant 
only on the 3rd and 6th days. Overpricing was not 
found in these issue years. 
Fig. 1. The calculated average CARs for the nine post-listing days between 2006 and 2011
Table 4. Post-listing returns 
Sample classification N
Day 3 Day 6 Day 10
CAR t-stat CAR t-stat CAR t-stat
All sample companies 254 0.24633 1.50236 0.24070 1.753312* 0.23345516 0.73694681
By industries 
Resources 143 0.17519 0.99419 0.17228 1.14107 0.16997 0.41786
Chemical/materials 4 -0.16029 -1.19323 -0.18414 -9.31558*** -0.23338 -1.18030
Industrial 46 0.68936 5.46692*** 0.67843 6.54090*** 0.66299 5.94402***
Consumer discretionary/staples 31 0.11135 0.57519 0.09562 0.69228 0.07341 0.48699
Information technology 20 0.09983 1.38996 0.09830 0.79474 0.10131 0.89582
Telecommunications 4 0.15416 1.53992 0.17258 1.95352** 0.13121 1.60006
Utilities 6 0.06337 0.25723 0.06818 0.86966 0.10006 0.61615
By listing year 
2006 68 0.22037 0.91661 0.18555 1.70326* 0.19214 1.02686
2007 91 0.14922 1.33777 0.15268 1.14235 0.12454 0.35407
2008 29 0.98972 4.68027*** 0.98209 4.38880*** 0.95905 3.77814***
2009 17 0.07568 0.73687 0.09411 0.72019 0.10400 0.89310
2010 41 0.11251 1.38781 0.12195 1.01284 0.11605 0.82415
2011 8 -0.07481 -0.95027 -0.05679 -0.72241 0.06993 0.06617
By issue year 
2005 9 0.63824 2.33499** 0.58679 4.77512*** 0.55002 3.07244***
2006 69 0.11442 0.51734 0.08432 0.80154 0.08676 0.46525
2007 96 0.42956 2.83458*** 0.43267 2.65843*** 0.40998 1.15344
2008 19 0.10511 1.01209 0.10894 0.66031 0.07555 0.35237
2009 16 0.11845 1.26930 0.13064 0.99786 0.12530 1.26236
2010 45 0.08440 1.02675 0.09647 0.89051 0.12358 0.27002
Notes: N = sample size, CAR = cumulative average abnormal return* statistically significant at 10% level, ** statistically significant 
at 5% level, *** statistically significant at 1% level.
Conclusion 
This research paper has analyzed the short-run 
market performance of the Australian IPOs listed from 
2006 to 2011 by using the first-day opening-price 
primary market returns, the closing-price secondary 
market returns and the post-listing returns. 
The analysis based on the first-day primary market 
returns and the post-listing returns shows that 
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Australian IPOs were underpriced in the short-run. 
This finding is in line with the underpricing of IPOs, 
which is widely accepted as a universal 
phenomenon. Although the Australian IPOs were 
underpriced, the post-listing returns indicate that the 
level of underpricing slowly decreased after the 
listing. The decreasing trend of post-listing returns 
is in line with the findings of Aktas et al. (2003), 
Kenourgios et al. (2007) and Kazantzis and Thomas 
(1996). However, Sohail et al. (2010) argue that this 
trend can be expected only up to the 10thday, under 
normal economic conditions. The decrease in post-
listing returns indicates that future investors may 
under-perform (over-pricing) in the long-run. 
The analysis of closing-price secondary market 
returns indicates that Australian IPOs were 
overpriced on abnormal and raw returns. 
Conversely, Chang et al. (2008) documented that 
Chinese IPOs were underpriced by 1.55% in the 
first-day closing-price secondary market. Analysis 
of the closing-price secondary market may be useful 
to investors, because the high returns of the first-day 
primary market are due to lack of information and 
the speculative behavior of investors. 
A substantial variation can be seen in the level of 
short-run performance in the analysis of the first-
day and post-listing returns by industry, listing year 
and issue year. IPOs issued by the chemical and 
materials industries were overpriced in the primary 
and secondary markets. Industrial-sector IPOs were 
underpriced by 68.03% on abnormal returns in the 
primary market, which was the highest level of 
underpricing relative to other sectors. The resource-
sector IPOs were underpriced in the primary market on 
both return measures, which was statistically 
significant at the 1% level. The study found that IPOs 
in the primary market were underpriced, except in 
2011, and overpriced in the secondary market. In the 
primary market, the levels of underpricing were 
statistically significant at 1%. In 2011, the levels of 
overpricing in both markets were not statistically 
significant. The level of overpricing in the secondary 
market was statistically significant in 2007 and 2010. 
The issue year analysis shows that IPOs in the primary 
market were underpriced and overpriced in the 
secondary market, except in 2008. Issued IPOs in both 
markets were underpriced in 2008, but not statistically 
significant. In the secondary market, statistically 
significant overpricing levels were found only in 2007 
and 2010.  
According to the post-listing analysis, industrial 
sector IPOs are the most attractive, being 
underpriced on CARs by 98.93%, 67.84%, and 
66.29% in the 3rd, 6th, and 10th days, respectively. 
These underpricing levels were statistically 
significant at the 1% level. However, IPOs in the 
chemical and material industries are not attractive to 
investors, because they were overpriced based on 
the CAR measure for all days. However, overall, the 
post-listing analysis shows that investors’ wealth 
has been decreasing as time goes by. 
Wealth creation analysis in the IPO market should 
not simply focus on the first-day total returns, but 
also consider the post-listing returns. Though 
investors’ wealth has increased in the primary market, 
the study concludes that it decreases in the first-day 
secondary market and the post-listing period. 
Further studies are needed to identify why 
Australian IPOs are overpriced in the first-day 
closing-price secondary market and why the level of 
underpricing declines after the first-day opening-
price primary market. 
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